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Obsolescence and Modernization in the 
Growth Process *




In this paper, an R&D based endogenous growth model is built 
up incorporating Schumpeterian growth and embodied technolog­
ical progress. Under embodiment, long run growth is shown to be 
affected by the following effects: (i) obsolescence costs add to the 
user cost of capital, reducing the research effort; and (ii) the mod­
ernization of capital through investment raises the incentives to 
undertake research activities. Applied to the understanding of 
the growth enhancing role of both capital and R&D subsidies, 
we conclude that the positive effect of modernization more than 
compensate the negative effect of obsolescence.
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The role of capital accumulation is a traditional issue in growth theory. 
In the neoclassical framework, investment only matters in the short run, 
while technological progress is the sole determinant of per-capita growth 
in the long run. Therefore, subsidizing capital accumulation has no per­
manent impact on the growth rate. In R&D based growth models a la 
Romer (1990), a similar conclusion could be drawn: Only subsidies to 
research activities, which precisely drive technological progress, are effec­
tive in boosting growth. However, Howitt and Aghion (1998) show that 
this result is biased by Romer’s assumptions. In particular, the assump­
tion that labor is the sole input in the production of research. Indeed, 
if the R&D sector employs capital goods as an input, capital accumu­
lation becomes important for long run growth, and subsidizing capital 
accumulation is growth enhancing.
This dichotomy between capital accumulation and technological 
progress was at the heart of the embodiment controversy in the sixties, 
as recently pointed out by Hercowitz (1998). Supporters of the embod­
iment hypothesis, Solow (1960) among them, argued that investment is 
the channel through which innovations are implemented, so that invest­
ment should be a decisive determinant of long run growth. Phelps (1962) 
radically questioned this view. Within an exogenous growth framework 
with both embodied and disembodied technological progress, he showed 
that while investment is important for the pace of the growth rate in 
the short run, it is not so in the long run. However, as stressed by 
Boucekkine, del Rio and Licandro (1999), Phelp’s results are a direct 
consequence of the exogenous nature of technical progress, at the core of 
the neoclassical growth theory. In order to understand the critical role 
of investment for growth, an endogenous growth model with embodied 
technical change is required.
From an empirical point of view, several recent contributions have 
stressed the role of embodiment in the growth process. DeLong and 
Summers (1991) find that countries with higher growth rates are precisely 



























































































relative price of equipment. For a sample of seven OECD countries, Wolff 
(1991) finds that catch-up in total factor productivity is highly correlated 
with capital accumulation. He also concludes that embodiment plays a 
central role in this relationship as productivity growth is highly sensitive 
to the age of the capital stock. Such a role of embodiment is indeed 
in DeLong and Summers contribution, since the observed decline in the 
relative price of equipment captures the embodied nature of technological 
progress (see Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell, 1997).
From the beginning of the embodiment controversy, has been inten­
sively discussed the argument according to which a negative correlation 
between growth and the average age of capital reflects the importance 
of embodiment (see the striking paper of Denison, 1964). However, by 
definition of the average age of capital, it is a decreasing function of the 
growth rate: in a high growth economy, the weight of new equipments is 
high and the average age of capital is small. Such a negative relation is 
then predicted by any growth model, independently of the embodied or 
disembodied nature of technical progress. Nonetheless, the moderniza­
tion of the capital stock associated with the decline of the average age of 
capital should be more important for growth under embodiment, where 
technical progress is incorporated in new equipment.
Aghion and Howitt (1998), section 3.2.4, provide some insight into 
how the long run growth rate is affected by embodiment. Under em­
bodied technical change the price of equipments permanently declines, 
which increases the user cost of capital. It is the so-called obsolescence 
cost: When an innovation occurs and new capital goods embodying this 
innovation come out, the value of old capital goods decreases. Aghion and 
Howitt claim that subsidies are less growth enhancing under embodied 
technological progress, because any increase in the rate of technologi­
cal progress should raise the user cost of capital reducing the incentives 
to undertake research activities. However, we claim that Aghion and 
Howitt’s argument does not capture all the implications of the embodi­
ment assumption, and as such it provides only a partial explanation.
In line with Solow (1960) and Krusell (1998), this paper introduces 




























































































tion model. The embodied nature of technical progress implicit in our 
model has two main implications. First, as pointed out by Aghion and 
Howitt (1998) the user cost of capital involves obsolescence costs, which 
partially compensate the positive effects of subsidies. Second, the re­
search effort is a positive function of investment. Under embodiment, 
the investment sector is the only one that benefits from innovations di­
rectly. Consequently, the expected value of R&D activities depends upon 
the demand for investment goods only. A rise in investment stimulates 
innovation and the associated increase in the rate of technical change 
has multiplicative effects by lowering the average age of capital, inducing 
a further rise in investment, which in turn affects the rate of technical 
progress. This modernization effect is specific to the embodied nature 
of technical progress. Moreover, we show that the modernization effect 
offsets the growth losses due to obsolescence costs, which improves the 
growth enhancing role of subsidies. Our analysis traces back indeed to 
the famous embodiment controversy. In our research-based endogenous 
growth model, the modernization effect is therefore a fundamental deter­
minant of long run growth. Accordingly, the modernization effect gives 
a theoretical support to the importance of the embodied question.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the proposed model 
is solved and its main properties are stressed. In particular, it is compared 
with the exogenous growth model with embodied technical change by 
Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997), and the R&D growth model 
with physical capital proposed by Howitt and Aghion (1998). The main 
economic mechanisms, obsolescence and modernization, are discussed. 
Section 3 is devoted to the analysis of the effects on growth of capital 
and research subsidies. Sufficient conditions under which the moderniza­
tion effect dominates the obsolescence effect are stated and interpreted. 
Section 4 concludes.
2 The M odel
The model in this paper is based on Aghion and Howitt (1992), and it 




























































































(1960). There are two final sectors, one producing a non durable good, 
and another producing an investment good. The non durable good is 
taken as the numeraire. Technology in the non durable sector is Cobb- 
Douglas on capital and labor, and the non durable good is allocated to 
consumption and as an input in both the production of intermediate 
goods and R&D activities. Technology in the investment goods sector is 
constant elasticity of substitution on a continuum of intermediate inputs. 
Both final sectors are competitive. In the intermediate sector a contin­
uum of differentiated goods is produced under monopolistic competition. 
Technology in this sector only employs non durable goods as inputs, and 
benefits directly from innovations developed in the R&D sector. Finally, 
the R&D sector is competitive and only employs the non durable good 
as an input.
The structure of the economy is very similar to the one in the two 
sector exogenous growth model of Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell 
(1997), where one sector employs capital and labor to produce a non 
durable good, and the other sector produces an investment good employ­
ing the non durable good as the sole input. In our model, the transforma­
tion of non durable goods in investment goods requires an intermediate 
step, i.e., the production of intermediate inputs. In both models, tech­
nological progress benefits the investment sector only, and requires new 
investments to propagate over the whole economy; the so-called embod­
ied nature of technological progress.
Howitt and Aghion (1998) combine the neoclassical growth model a 
la Solow (1956) and their 1992 creative destruction model, and share some 
key properties with our model, in particular that quality improvements 
are the engine of growth and profits in the intermediate sector are the 
main incentive to innovate. However and differently from our model, 
Howitt and Aghion assume that technical progress is disembodied: A 
sole final goods sector produces both consumption and investment goods, 
and benefits from quality improvements in the intermediate sector. As 
it is shown in the next, the different nature of technological progress is 





























































































2.1 Growth Under Embodiment
As in the standard optimal growth model, an infinitely lived representa­
tive dynasty endowed with L > 0 units of labor maximizes intertemporal 
utility. The Euler equation related to the dynasty problem is
^  = (1) 
Ot a
As usual, the growth rate of per-capita consumption, Ct, depends on the 
difference between the interest rate r t and the dynasty’s discount rate 
p, weighted by the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 
a > 0 and a ^  1, which is supposed to be constant.
Technology in the investment sector displays constant returns to 
scale on a continuum of intermediate inputs in the interval [0,1]:
where It is per-capita investment, Xjt is the per-capita amount of the 
intermediate good j  used in the production of the investment good, and 
a  6 ]0,1[. The problem of the representative firm in the investment 
sector is purely static. She takes prices as given and maximizes current 
profits subject to the technological constraint (2). The optimal demand 
for the intermediate good j  is:
= (3)
where Pt is the price of the investment good and pJt is the price of the 
j th  intermediate good. The so-called ‘true price index’ associated with 
technology (2) is given by
p-G f^ r  w
The technology in the intermediate sector is linear on a sole input, 




























































































of the j th  intermediate good is qjt . The sector is under monopolistic 
competition and each intermediate good is produced by one firm only. 
Given the demand function (3), the j th  monopolist optimally sets the 
price
1 1
P it  = -----------•
«  Qjt
(5)
The markup, is constant and equal for all monopolists, and ~  is the 




Qt = ( J \ ] r  d j y  (?)
is a quality index of the inputs used in the production of the durable 
good. The relative price of the investment good is an inverse function 
of the average quality of intermediate inputs. In a stationary growth 
regime, Qt must be growing at a positive constant rate, implying that 
the relative price of investment goods must be permanently declining. 
Notice also that the price of any intermediate good relative to the price 
of the investment good is ^  =  ^i, and only depends on its relative 
quality. More efficient intermediate goods are sold at smaller prices.
The per-capita amount of non durable goods employed in the pro­
duction of intermediate goods is given by
* t =  r  ̂  d j = a
Jo Qjt Q t
(8)
The left hand side of this equation can be easily obtained after combina­
tion of (3), and (7).
In the non durable goods sector, technology is Cobb-Douglas, i.e., 
/  (K t) =  K?, where K t is the per-capita stock of capital. The law of 




























































































(9)k t  =  It -  SKt,
where 6 > 0 is the depreciation rate.
In this sector, the representative firm takes prices as given and 
maximizes the discounted flow of profits subject to these technological 
constraints. Capital accumulation is subsidized at the rate /?*, > 0, so 
that firms face the discount rate rt — Pk- Prom the first order conditions 
of this problem, the marginal productivity of capital must be equal to 
the corresponding user cost:
- / ? * ) •  ( 1 0 )
As expected, changes in the price of investment goods have a negative 
effect on the user cost of capital. From (6), the decline on investment 
prices is equal to the growth rate of the quality index, i.e., —
Quality improvements in the intermediate sector move the technological 
frontier up, reducing the future price of investment goods and acting as 
a brake on capital accumulation. This is the so-called obsolescence cost 
related to embodied technical change.
At equilibrium, per-capita production of the non durable good is 
allocated to consumption, Ct, and as inputs in the production of both 
the intermediate sector, X t, and the R&D sector, Dt. All variables are 
in per-capita terms.
Combining equations (1), (6), (8) to (10) and the equilibrium in 
the non durable sector, we get
f ( K t )  = Pt n + s ~ T ,




~  I aQt a K T ^
f’(Kt)
(p + 6 + yt -  pK)




























































































This system is very close to the system representing the equilib­
rium of an optimal growth model with embodied technical change, as in 
Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997). Along a balanced growth path 
with positive growth, it can be easily shown that the growth rate of con­
sumption is smaller than the growth rate of investment. Consequently, 
our model reproduces the main empirical facts related to embodiment. 
First, from (6) the relative price of investment permanently decline at the 
rate of embodied technical change, 7 . Second, the investment to output 
ratio permanently increases.1
The three main differences between our model and Greenwood, 
Hercowitz and Krusell are the following. First, the production of the 
final good may also be allocated to R&D activities. Second, the obso­
lescence cost, 71, is endogenous. Its behavior is analyzed in the next 
sub-section. Finally, monopolistic competition in the intermediate goods 
sector implies that the marginal productivity of capital is multiplied by 
a, the inverse of the markup rate. Under exogenous growth, i.e. Rt =  0, 
7t =  7  > 0, and perfect competition in the intermediate goods sector, 
these two equations become equivalent to the dynamic system in Green­
wood, Hercowitz and Krusell.
2.2 Shumpeterian R&D A ctivities
In this section, the rate of embodied technical change is endogenized 
following Aghion and Howitt (1992). Let Qjt =  qKjt, where qKjt repre­
sents the quality grad of the j th  intermediate good at time t, q > 0 
being a constant.2 K]t represents the number of quality improvements 
of the jth  intermediate good achieved up to date t. As usual in this
'Based on the economic theory on index numbers, Licandro, Ruiz-Castillo and 
Duran (2001) find that, in this framework, the growth rate of output must be defined 
as in NIPA’s methodology, i.e., it is approximately equal to a  linear combination of 
the growth rates of consumption and investment. Consequently, the growth rate of 
output is smaller than  the growth rate of investment.
2To be more precise, q must be larger than  The latter condition states th a t the 
difference in quality between two successive innovations should be sufficiently large, 




























































































literature, a researcher discovering a new quality grade is supposed to 
have the monopoly right to produce the good at the obtained quality. 
Consequently, when a new quality improvement occurs incumbents lose 
automatically their monopoly rentals. This feature generates a Shum- 
peterian process of creative destruction.
How does the creative destruction process take place for the jth  
intermediate good? Let qKj be the leading quality grade at time t. If a 
researcher successfully introduce an innovation at this time, the quality 
grade increases to qK*+1. The innovation is assumed to come out accord­
ing to a Poisson process, where qKj denotes the Poisson arrival rate. The 
technology in this sector is assumed to be qKj = nKj 4> (Kj), where nKj is 
the amount of non durable goods devoted to research in quality improve­
ments. The Poisson arrival rate q is supposed to be a decreasing function 
of the research task, here captured by k. Hence, </>' (k) < 0. More pre­
cisely, we set 4> (k) = Ag_^ +1̂ Tr°, where A is a positive parameter, and 
the remaining term represents the negative effect of the complexity of 
the research task on the Poisson arrival rate. This choice is consistent, 
as it is shown later, with an equilibrium Poisson probability ultimately 
independent of the complexity of the research task.
The expected value of an innovation discovered at time t, VT.+i,t, 
is equal to the expected flow of profits it generates. The instantaneous 
profits of the kj + 1 innovator, for all time z > t  until she will be displaced 
by the k3 +  2 innovator, are given by
^Kj + l,Z
1 -  a IZL
q qKi+1
The last equality comes after substitution of p3 from (5) and Xj from (3), 
using the condition p- =  ^  ■ Given the embodied nature of technological 
progress, the benefits of R&D are addresses to the investment sector. 
Consequently, the instantaneous profits of an innovator depend on the 
demand for investment goods only, in contrast to Howitt and Aghion 
where technological progress is disembodied and benefits also the con­




























































































to the investment sector, enlarging the importance of investment in the 
growth process.
Then,
VKJ+1 , t  =  j f °  7rKj.+1,z e- ^ ( r-+"«i+1'*) ds dz, (11)
where the two exponential terms in the integrand represent respectively 
the discount factor and the probability of the quality grade qK>+1 still 
leading at time z > t.
Let us assume that the research sector is competitive and research is 
subsidized at the rate Pr . The arbitrage condition for a strictly positive 
amount of resources spent in R&D activities stipulates that the marginal 
cost of research should be equal to the expected present value of profits, 
that is:
l - 0 R = ct>(Kj + l)V Kj+u. (12)
This arbitrage condition implies VKj+i,t =  0, which yields by differentia­
tion o f (11)
VLKj+l,t
1 — Cl q ^ +1)T ^  
a rt + r)Kj+1 Q r 'I tL . (13)
Prom (12) and (13), it turns out that the Poisson arrival rate, r/Kj+i, 
does not depend on the complexity of the research task, that is qKj+x = rj 
Vj. This means that quality improvements can occur for all types of in­
termediate goods with the same probability, whatever the quality grade 
is. This property of the model is entirely due to the specification of func­
tion 0(/c), as outlined by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). The Poisson 
arrival rate rjK is affected by k in two opposite ways. First, the monopoly 
profits accruing to an innovator increase with «, since its productivity 
depends directly on it. Secondly, by assumption, the probability of in­
novating decreases with the difficulty of the task, measured by k . When 





























































































As set out above, at equilibrium Poisson arrival rates are equal 
for all intermediate goods. By the Law of Large Numbers, the average 
growth rate of Q(t) is
7t  =  QVt, ( 14)
where q =  -j-9̂  — l j ■ Prom (13) and (14), the arbitrage condition
(12) can be written as
1 — Pr = A
l - q  Q r 'h L
a  ri +  f  '
(15)
Finally, the equilibrium allocation of non durable inputs to the 
production of R&D activities is given by Dt = nKjt dj .  Since the 
equilibrium Poisson arrival rates are the same for all intermediate goods, 
using (14), we get after some trivial algebra:
■ <16>
2.3 Shumpeterian Growth Under Em bodim ent
In order to characterize the equilibrium of this economy, the following
variable changes are introduced. Concerning non durable consumption
and inputs, zt =  ZtQ?~l for Z  € {C ,X ,D }. Concerning capital and 
1
investment, zt = ZtQ*~l for Z  e {/, K }. Implicit in this transformation 
is that consumption grows at a smaller rate than both investment and 
capital, a direct implication of embodied technical change. The equilib­
rium of this economy can be characterized by the following differential 




P 71 , 1 — a J (17)
(<5+ i t ]  h , (18)V 1 - a  )




























































































fcf =  Ct+ it + -ry-zlt XL q (20)




The differential system (17)-(21) is very similar to the system gov­
erning the dynamics of Howitt and Aghion (1998). There are however 
three main differences, all of them related to the diverse nature of tech­
nological progress. First, consumption and capital grow at different rates 
along the balanced growth path, which is reflected by the terms contain­
ing 7  in (17) and (18). Second, under embodied technical change, the 
user cost of capital in (19) involves obsolescence costs, 71. Finally, under 
embodied technical change the expected value of R&D, on the right hand 
side of (21), depends on investment only, while in Howitt and Aghion it 
depends on final production. In the next sub-section, an economic inter­
pretation is given to these differences.
Finally, let us define the average age of capital, which turns out to 
be central in our interpretation of the main mechanisms at work in this 
model:
r* T(z) e ~ s (t_ *)
m{t) = J j t ~ z) K(i) dz- (22)
2.4 The Balanced Growth Path
We define a balanced growth path (BGP) as an equilibrium path along 
which r (, 7(, Cf, it and kt are all constant. From (22) and after some 
substitutions, (17)-(19) and (21) becomes
aka * = — (r +  6 +  7 - PK) 
a (K)
1 — a —
1 -  Pr = X L ----------a r + i (A)Q
a






























































































Equation (K) is the optimal condition for capital and it express 
the steady-state value of capital intensity as a function of the user cost 
of capital. Equation (A) is the arbitrage condition in the R&D sector, 
taking into account that i =  Equation (R) is the standard Fisher 
equation showing up how the interest rate depends on the growth rate of 
consumption along the BGP. Finally, equation (M), simply states that 
the average age of capital must be equal to the inverse of the depreciation 
rate plus the growth rate of capital. The BGP can be first solve for k 
and 7 , after substitution of (R) and (M) in (K) and (A). Proposition 1, 
at the end of this sub-section, states sufficient conditions for existence 
and uniqueness of a positive rate of technical progress along the balanced 
growth path.
Our model has two main features. The first is related to the effect 
of obsolescence on the user cost of capital. As argued by Aghion and 
Howitt (1998), section 3.2.4, obsolescence costs mitigate any positive 
effect on long-run growth. The reason is straightforward. A rise in the 
rate of technical change increases the user cost of capital, by raising 
obsolescence costs. This increase in the user cost reduces the demand 
for capital, equation (K). Since the expected value of R&D is positively 
related to the demand for capital, equation (A), a decrease in the later 
reduces the intensity of R&D activities and, consequently, the rate of 
technical progress. This is the obsolescence mechanism refired by Aghion 
and Howitt (1998).
The second feature is related to the crucial role of investment in 
the growth process. As mentioned before, our model predicts that the 
demand for investment goods, i =  is a determinant of the research ef­
fort. This implies that a rise in investment stimulates innovation: More 
resources are devoted to R&D, which increases the rate of embodied 
technical progress. An increase in the rate of technical progress has mul­
tiplicative effects by lowering the average age of capita, and inducing a 
further rise in investment, which in turn affects the rate of technologi­
cal progress and the average age of capital. This is the modernization




























































































mechanism, that the embodiment assumption gives rise to.
It is worth pointing out here that the embodied nature of technical 
progress is at the bases of the two key differences between our model 
and Howitt and Aghion (1998), where technical progress is disembodied. 
First, under disembodied technological progress and in contrast to the 
embodiment case, the obsolescence rate is zero and is not a determinant 
of the user cost of capital. Second, under disembodied technical progress 
the incentives to innovate depend on capital, while under embodiment 
they depend on investment only. In other terms, the modernization effect 
as depicted above only arise when technical progress is embodied, and it 
is crucial to understand the impact of capital subsidies on growth. This 
point is studied in section 3.
Before pursuing the analyzes, let us first establish a sufficient condi­
tion for existence and uniqueness of a balanced path with positive growth.
P roposition  1 I f L > where r  = (1 — a) a 1̂ », there
exists a unique solution to the system (K)-(M) with 7 > 0.
The proof is in the appendix. Proposition 1 states that labor re­
sources should be large enough to a BGP with positive growth be sus­
tainable. Though this kind of conditions is very often required in endoge­
nous growth models (even in the simplest ones, see Romer, 1986), it is 
absolutely needed in our framework to additionally rule out multiplicity. 
Positivity of k can then be easily showed. Finally, as in the standard 
growth model the condition p > (1 — a) yr^7 is required to get bounded 
utility, and it implies that c and i are strictly positive along the BGP.
3 On the Im pact of Subsidies under Em­
bodim ent
In this section, the study of the impact on growth of capital and R&D 




























































































and Aghion (1998) are analyzed. Later, the interaction between the 
obsolescence and the modernization mechanisms is investigated.
3.1 The Long-run Effects of Capital and R&D Sub­
sidies
Capital and research subsidies have both a positive effect on growth, as 
the following proposition shows:
P roposition  2 I f  7  > 0 at steady state, 7  increases when either (3k or 
Pu increases.
The proof is in the Appendix. Both subsidies stimulate technical 
progress. From equation (K), an increase in capital subsidies reduces the 
user cost of capital, stimulating capital accumulation. From equation 
(A), an increased demand for capital goods spurs research and rises the 
rate of technical progress. Obsolescence costs partially reduce the initial 
effect of subsidies. However, the implied reduction in the average age of 
capital, equation (M), put the modernization effect at work multiplying 
the initial positive effect. Indeed, an increase in Pk tends to shift up­
ward the marginal return to innovation, while the marginal cost is kept 
constant. On the other hand, an increase in research subsidy /3r has the 
same expansive effects through a direct reduction in the marginal cost of 
research. Therefore, subsidizing capital or research has the same qualita­
tive effects in the long run. As pointed out by Howitt and Aghion (1998), 
this result is in contradiction with the traditional dichotomy between the 
accumulation of capital as a short run determinant of the growth process, 
and R&D as the exclusive determinant of long run growth.
3.2 M odernization vs Obsolescence
Aghion and Howitt (1998), section 3.2.4, provide an intuitive explanation 




























































































order to do that, they modify Howitt and Aghion by adding the obsoles­
cence cost to the user cost of capital, as we do in equation (K), and found 
that capital intensity should be smaller at steady state. Consequently, 
they argue that an increase in capital subsidies has a lower positive effect 
on growth if obsolescence costs are to be considered. This paper shows 
that Aghion and Howitt’s argument is incomplete, since it does not take 
into account the modernization effect of investment associated to the em­
bodiment hypothesis. If it is taken into account, the rise in the rate of 
technical change due to capital subsidies yields indeed a decline in the 
average age of capital, which again stimulates research and growth. This 
additional mechanism may well rule out the main conclusion of Aghion 
and Howitt, namely the negative effect of embodiment on the efficiency 
of capital subsidies.
Proposition 3 establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
positive effect of modernization more than compensate the negative effect 
of obsolescence.
P roposition  3 The modernization effect is larger than the obsolescence 
effect if only if r -  3 ^ 7  > 0K.
The proof is in the Appendix.
A better understanding of Proposition 3 can be achieved by ab­
stracting from the effects of 7  others than those operating through the 
obsolescence and the modernization mechanisms. Prom equation (A), 
an increase in the obsolescence cost rises the user cost of capital and 
reduces the demand for capital. The elasticity of the demand for capital 
with respect to the obsolescence cost is proportional to the weight of 
obsolescence costs in the user cost of capital. In order to the modern­
ization effect fully compensate the obsolescence effect, the demand for 
investment must remain unchanged after the induced reduction in the 
demand for capital. If not, the reduced incentives for R&D should lower 
the rate of technical progress. Indeed, investment could be accommo­
dated by a reduction in the average age of capital, such that ^




























































































to hold. Consequently, the positive effect of modernization fully compen­
sate the negative effect of obsolescence costs if the user cost of capital, 
r +  7  +  S — (3k , is equal to the inverse of the average age of capital, 
+  <5. Nevertheless, if the user cost of capital is larger (smaller) than 
the inverse of the average age of capital, the modernization effect more 
(less) than compensate the obsolescence effect.
As stated at the end of sub-section 2.4, p > (1 — a) yr^7 is required 
to get bounded utility. This condition is equivalent to r  — yr“ 7  > 0. 
Consequently, if capital subsidies are near to zero the modernization 
effect always dominates, and the positive effect of subsidies is larger under 
embodiment than under disembodied technical change.
4 Conclusions
This paper introduces capital accumulation and embodied technical progress 
into a Shumpeterian creative destruction model. The embodied nature 
of technical progress has two main implications. First, the user cost of 
capital involves obsolescence costs, which affects negatively research ac­
tivities. Second, the modernization of capital through investment raises 
the incentives to undertake R&D activities. A rise in the rate of tech­
nical change has multiplicative effects by lowering the average age of 
capital, inducing a rise in investment, which in turn affects the rate of 
technical progress. The modernization of capital is showed to offset the 
growth losses due to obsolescence costs, which in particular improves the 
growth enhancing role of subsidies. Accordingly, modernization gives a 
theoretical support to the importance of the embodied question.
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A A ppendix
P ro o f of P roposition  1: To prove existence and uniqueness of strictly 
positive solutions for 7 , some tedious algebra is needed. Indeed after 
successive substitutions from equations (K), (R) and (M) into (A), we 
can write 7  as an implicit function of the sole parameters of the problem:
1 — 0r =
T X L ( ^  + 6)
[{°T=Z+9~1) l  + p\ [(0rT=s +  l ) 7  +  <5 +  p - / V p
= A (7)
^  (23)
where T =  (1 — a) q 1-». It is easy to check that function A (7 ) has the
following properties: (i) A(0) = -----rxLS 1 , (ii) the limit of A is zero
(P+6-0k)1-a P
when 7 tends to infinity, (iii) A is continuous and strictly increasing in L 
and (iv) there is at most one 7  > 0 such that A' (7 ) = 0 . From properties
(i)-(iv) follows that for all L > there is only one strictly
positive solution to (23).□
P ro o f of P roposition  2: Proposition 2 follows directly from (23) since 
A (7 ) is an increasing function of /3k and the left hand side of (23) is a 
decreasing function of 8r .O
P ro o f of P roposition  3: The steady-state of 7  is implicitly defined by 

































































































some algebra, we get
d-y
W k OT^+i-1 ,
T+71J- 1 ^ + 1(l-a)r
(l-o)r_______________
1________ 1
+ (1 — a)r  (1 — a)m





(ATL) 1 (r+  yq
1 1
(1_Q)r (1 — a)r (1 — a)m




where r = r + S + y  — p x  is the user cost of capital. The modernization 
effect is higher than the obsolescence effect if only if
_ 1 Ol































































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the 
European University Institute, Florence
Copies can be obtained free of charge 
- depending on the availability of stocks - from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Instiute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































Publications of the European University Institute
To The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) - Italy 





□  Please send me a list of EUI Working Papers
□  Please send me a list of EUI book publications
□  Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 2002/2003
Please send me the following EUI Working Paper(s):
Dept, n°, author ...........................................................................
Title: .....................................................................................................
Dept, n°, author ...........................................................................
Title: ..............................................................................
Dept, n°, author ...........................................................................
Title: .....................................................................................................



































































































Central Limit Theorem for Asymmetric
Kernel Functionals
ECO 2000/2
Ray BARRELL/Alvaro M. PINA 
How Important are Automatic Stabilizers 
in Europe? A Stochastic Simulation 
Assessment
ECO 2000/3
Karen DURY/ Alvaro M. PINA 
Fiscal Policy in EMU: Simulating the 




Non-parametric Specification Tests for 
Conditional Duration Models
ECO 2000/5
Yadira GONZALEZ DE LARA 




The Impact of Selling Information on
Competition
ECO 2000/7
Anindya BANERJEE/Bill RUSSELL 
The Relationship Between the Markup 








Asymmetry and Leapfrogging in a 
Step-by-Step R&D-race
ECO 2000/10
Andreas BEYER/Jurgen A. 
DOORNIK/David F. HENDRY 
Constructing Historical Euro-Zone Data
ECO 2000/11
Norbert WUTHE
Exchange Rate Volatility's Dependence 
on Different Degrees of Competition 
under Different Learning Rules - 
A Market Microstructure Approach
ECO 2000/12
Michael EHRMANN 
Firm Size and Monetary Policy 




Economic Growth and (Re-)Distributive 




Leaving State Jobs in Russia
ECO 2000/15
Spren JOHANSEN 
A Small Sample Correction of the Test 












Growth Externalities, Unions, and Long­
term Wage Accords
ECO 2000/19
Joao AMARO DE MATOS/
Marcelo FERNANDES
































































































Some Cautions on the Use of Panel 
Methods for Integrated Series of Macro- 
economic Data
ECO 2000/21
Anindya BANERJEE/Bill RUSSELL 
The Markup and the Business Cycle 
Reconsidered
ECO 2000/22
Anindya BANERJEE/Bill RUSSELL 












Adaptive Learning and the Cyclical 




The Asymptotic Variance of the Estimated 
Roots in a Cointegrated Vector 
Autoregressive Model
ECO 2001/2
Spren JOHANSEN/Katarina JUSELIUS 
Controlling Inflation in a Cointegrated 
Vector Autoregressive Model with an 




International Risk-Sharing in the Short 
Run and in the Long Run
ECO 2001/4
Thomas HINTERMAIER 






Roel C.A. OOMEN 
Using High Frequency Stock Market 
Index Data to Calculate, Model & 
Forecast Realized Return Variance
ECO 2001/7
D.M. NACHANE/R. LAKSHMI 
Measuring Variability of Monetary Policy 
Lags: A Frequency Domain Aproach
ECO 2001/8
Marco BUTI/Wemer ROEGER/Jan 
IN T VELD
Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions 
under a Stability Pact
ECO 2001/9
Sascha BECKER/Frank SIEBERN- 
THOMAS
Returns to Education in Germany: A 
Variable Treatment Intensity Approach
ECO 2001/10
David FIELDING/Paul MIZEN 
The Relationship between Price 
Dispersion and Inflation: A Reassessment
ECO 2001/11
Dilip M. NACHANE
Financial Liberalisation and Monetary
Policy: The Indian Evidence
ECO 2001/12
Fragiskos ARCHONTAKIS
Testing the Order of Integration in a VAR
Model for 1(2) Variables
ECO 2001/13
Florin Ovidiu BILB HE 
Delegation and Coordination in Fiscal- 
Monetary Policy Games: Implementation 





































































































Factor Forecasts for the UK
ECO 2001/16
Florin Ovidiu BILB HE 
Inflation Contracts, Targets and Strategic 




Vertical Integration and R&D Spillovers:
Is There a Need for 'Firewalls'?
ECO 2001/18
Raouf BOUCEKKINE/Femando DEL 
RIO/OmarLICANDRO 
Obsolescence and Modernization in the 
Growth Process
*out of print
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
